Professor Hall with this work supplements the earlier bibliography of T. E. Jessop, who has collaborated on some of the entries in the current work. There is an overlap of some ten years, inasmuch as Hall’s work commences with the year 1930; entries run through early 1971. The bibliography is extensive, containing some 800 items in all the various Western languages as well as transliterated Japanese. In addition, attention is directed to critical studies of many of the listings. An eighteen-page (...) subject index contributes further to making this a quite useful and valuable addition to the field of Hume scholarship.—R. J. G. (shrink)

The title of this work evokes suspicion: how can Soll aim at one "part"--metaphysics--of a philosophy such as Hegel's? How would one go about introducing only Hegel's metaphysics? One might, with some validity, go about discussing Hegel's metaphysics ; but how would one, assuming his reader's general unfamiliarity with Hegel, introduce his "metaphysics," and that alone? Alas, one's worst fears are soon realized: the opening sentence reads, "Hegel's method is best approached by asking what he was trying to accomplish with (...) it." Bifurcation. The operant supposition which guides the work is that Hegel "has" a method with which he attempts to "do" various things. This view is utterly un-Hegelian, as even a cursory reading of the introduction to the Logic, to cite only one source, illustrates. No guide to Hegel is going to be useful that clouds this fundamental point. The whole texture of Hegel's integrated and integrative system is never rescued. Soll's presentation approaches, and treats of, Hegel from the standpoint of pedestrian philosophizing, leaning heavily on the collected tradition to make distinctions in a glib and altogether external way. From his starting point, Soll proceeds, drawing on a handful of secondary sources, to deliver an extended series of facile, shotgun commentaries: but if one already has the ability to adjudge which of them find their mark, he does not need the book in the first place. The primary problem a book of this kind faces is the perhaps insuperable difficulty of creating a suitable "introduction" to Hegel's thought. And to be fair, one might say that most of the shortcomings of Soll's book are attributable to this problem. Where does one start, if not where Hegel did; and whither does one proceed, except in the direction Hegel did? One should either attempt to go that path, or elect not to go at all. It is too easy to lose one's way in so dense a forest.--R. J. G. (shrink)

This book is a collection of essays, and is an exercise in literary criticism. Most of the entries couple a philosopher with a literary artist, and the majority of these have an emphasis on the philosophical partner which one frequently fails to find in this sort of study. While few of the critics are capable of sustaining their subtle distinctions, a task properly required of a philosopher, it is nonetheless true that few philosophers can likewise do this. The ability to (...) systematically sustain these distinctions is what characterizes those first-order thinkers whom the body of philosophers and critics alike study. Granting this, the fact still remains that first-rate criticism is vastly more palatable intellectual fodder than is less than first-rate philosophizing. Studies such as the current one bring philosophy back into reality; the relation of a philosopher’s thought to his period, in all of the latter’s diversity, gives to that thought a realistic character that more transparently informs the creations of the fine arts than it does the original products of thought. And if thought is to avoid the sterility which so antagonized both a Sterne and a Hegel, and to become genuinely meaningful, this larger context will be forever indispensable.—R. J. G. (shrink)

The point of departure in this work is a defense against that view which would hold Hegel to be a glorifier of the Prussian state, a reactionary, and an enemy of freedom. Hegel, as the work illustrates, recognized that the French Revolution only annihilated what was already in itself destroyed; and he saluted it with "rapture" as the coming of a "new dawn" in the preface of the Encyclopaedia. He continued to celebrate its anniversary even while at the same time (...) and with no less intensity holding before himself an awareness of the dangers and horrors which it occasioned. In fact, Ritter submits that one might well understand the idea of freedom brandished by the Revolution to be the fundamental element of Hegel’s entire philosophy. Hegel disengages the notion of freedom from all previous connections which, over the centuries, have distorted it, and recovers the classic definition of Aristotle : "free is the man who is for himself and not for another." Political order must guarantee this possibility. The problem posited by the Revolution is: how? Hegel, the supposed "reactionary," in all his writings, both public and private, was consistently opposed, and occasionally with passion, to any political restoration. Yet one should also take notice of Hegel’s extreme and profound antipathy for the associations of students and demagogical movements, which he saw had no rapport with the real political and historical events of the time. Both the romantic liberal and the romantic conservative united in "hatred against the law." They were concerned not with freedom as such, but with political activity which pretended to be in its service, spewing platitudes which would renounce all searching knowledge and make truth an affair of the heart, the soul, or enthusiasm. Hegel alone, with perhaps the exception of Goethe, perceived the profound danger of anarchy revealed in these movements, a danger menacing to all, when one elevates pure subjectivity and sentiment to the rank of norm for political structures. The Revolution was accompanied by the dissolution of all the representations, concepts, and norms of the previous world as if they had been the fabric of dreams. In the face of this event, along with that of the constant danger of anarchy, philosophy must furnish the ideas which can determine that which can be conserved and that which can no longer survive. For both the advocates of restoration and the revolutionaries the Revolution was understood to be the end of previous history, the severing of man from his past: one wanted merely to recover it, the other to bury it. This scission, together with the real power which it has exerted on man and his conscience, is the fundamental structure of the new age. The remainder of the current study pursues the development of this scission, revealing the inner contradiction of the poles when taken alone: the scission itself to be the unity of historic existence in the form of subjectivity and objectivity; and the scission to find its objective expression in modern civil society. There is an on-going enrichment in the notion of freedom until it finds its fulfillment in the modern State, which assures freedom by providing the structures through which it can exist. Most of what should be said is said, although Ritter’s presentation occasionally harbors some confusion, a common and probably inescapable fate when one cuts in on the dialectic to forage for an isolated topic. Still, the book achieves its goal with admirable success, and is certainly a valuable tract on Hegel vis-à-vis the notion of political freedom. The main work is a translation from the German original; it is followed by an address which develops the material in the Philosophy of Right, § 34-81; and the book concludes with a rather amazing fifty-page bibliography citing the influence exercised by Hegel’s political theory throughout the nineteenth century.—R. J. G. (shrink)

This book aims at remedying the deficiency which the author sees in the fact that not a single critical study of Heidegger's treatment of the history of philosophy has appeared in English. Magnus finds the basic theme of Heidegger's later works to lie in this treatment. He is concerned that "no sustained efforts have hitherto been made to come to grips with the methodological questions which Heidegger's hermeneutic occasions," and considers Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche in order to make such an (...) effort. His ultimate motive in so doing is to present his conclusion that "to interpret the great philosophers from Heidegger's point of vantage... is ruinous to the history of philosophy as a discipline and is foreign to Heidegger's own thinking as well." The book is divided into two parts, the first clarifying Nietzsche's presentation of eternal recurrence; the second critically considering Heidegger's methodological approach in general and his conclusions vis-à-vis Nietzsche. The study will show a "partial and inadequate reading of Plato and Descartes" on Heidegger's part; the inadequacy of Heidegger's bald imputation of a "correspondence" epistemology reigning supreme throughout Western philosophy; and the textual evidence cited by Heidegger in his study of Nietzsche to be inadequate to his purposes. Chapter One of Part I points out the questionable nature of the material in Nietzsche's Nachlass; also, that much of the material consists of notes which Nietzsche abandoned or rejected as unfit for inclusion into the published works to which they refer. Nowhere in the published works or those designated for publication is the doctrine of eternal recurrence posited explicitly in "empirical-cosmological" terms. Magnus points out that Nietzsche scholars are unanimous in failing to draw the crucial methodological distinction between his published and unpublished works. To make this distinction is to come to recognize that the significance of eternal recurrence for Nietzsche is its existential imperative and not its empirical verification, which he mulled over as a "corroborative" hypothesis in his notes ; and which was attempted to confirm a doctrine which he had already embraced for other reasons. To understand this primary attraction to the doctrine one must consider Nietzsche's methodological challenging of the law of contradiction, his temperamental abhorrence of systematic, i.e. analytic philosophy. This latter methodology properly obtains in the empirical "proof" which was presented above as of derivative importance. To get at the existential significance of the doctrine, one might properly consider it "within the context of its opposition to three interpenetrating realities as Nietzsche understood them: Metaphysics, Christianity, and nihilism." This is the concern of the remainder of Chapter Three. Eternal recurrence emerges as the doctrine of becoming, and is seen to be "a critique [sic] and alternative to metaphysics." Part II illustrates how Heidegger reworked his understanding of Western philosophy from the period of Being and Time, when metaphysics was seen to begin with Aristotle and to have had its "decisive" phases with Descartes and Kant, to the subsequent consideration of its having begun with Plato and having had its "decisive" culmination with Nietzsche. Magnus argues that the contention that for Plato truth devolved from alétheia to orthotes is highly questionable; that the "humanistic" truth criterion of Western metaphysics pervades Heidegger's own Being and Time; and that the claim by Heidegger that Western philosophers have traditionally presupposed a subject/object correspondence conception of truth is patently false. He concludes that "[Heidegger's] interpretation is subordinated to a thesis which superimposes its meaning upon the history of philosophy." It remains the task of the concluding two chapters to elucidate how this "metahistory" of philosophy distorts Nietzsche's critique and alternative to metaphysics into the very embodiment of metaphysics. This project points out the disparity in the understanding of "nihilism" between the two thinkers; likewise, their variant understandings of the crucial notion of "revenge"; and, finally, Nietzsche's thoroughgoing rejection of Being as a precisely metaphysical notion. Magnus shows that the contexts from which Heidegger draws the quotations for his Nietzschean meditations themselves refute his distorted interpretation of Nietzsche's doctrine. A more careful consideration might not sacrifice thinking broadly in order to think deeply. Heidegger's metahistorical methodology Heideggerizes every philosopher to which he turns; hence, the Heideggerian virtue is "to comprehend and express not what another thinker thought/said, but what he did not think/say, could not think/say, and why he could not think/say it". To consider Nietzsche in terms of what he said regarding eternal recurrence rather in terms of the fundamentally contradictory words which Heidegger attributes to him, is to see the doctrine as the ultimate affirmation of becoming--and to see Heidegger as the last metaphysician. The serious alternative to metaphysics rests with Nietzsche.--R. J. G. (shrink)

This exceedingly rich book can be understood as an attempt to grasp the nature of Hegel’s system, specifically the relationship obtaining between that system and its vaunted "transitions." This attempt is carried out through a study of Hegel’s account of Vorstellung and thought. The operational point d'appui of the study is what Clark identifies as the central paradox essentially inherent in his subject, which may be variously formulated as: how language can be the "other" of thought and yet sublated in (...) thought; how pure thought can abide an other; how the Logic can from within itself develop its categories to absolute fulfillment and yet refer beyond itself to its fulfillment; how Hegel can be understood to have "completed" philosophy in the first quarter of the nineteenth century; how one makes sense of the notion of an essentially temporal eternality; how the Logic and the Phenomenology of Mind can each presuppose the other. The developing treatment of this paradox constitutes almost an object lesson in the "preserved" aspect of aufhebung—The or a methodological enactment of the second book of the Logic—for Clark wrestles with the tacky conceptual framework upon which rests the topic under investigation. The whole is deftly handled. Particularly inspired is the close analysis of the Theoretical Mind chapter of the Philosophy of Spirit and its bearing upon the Logic’s "Essence." This coupling, together with a treatment of the Philosophy of Religion constitutes one of the two foci of the book. What comes clear from this extended study is an appreciation of the fundamental difficulties connected with any philosophical explanation that has failed to resolve satisfactorily the relationship between ground and consequent and treats them either as being simply different or from the standpoint of a simply presumed totality. Clark’s considered position is that Hegel’s thought is paradoxical precisely in its intelligibility. Ultimately, he can only reiterate the paradox one final time: "The paradox of a Logic that is at once the whole and but a part of experience is thus a systematic expression of the need for reconciliation of a standpoint that is simply accomplished and a standpoint that is ever accomplishing itself." Now for the misgivings, which are for the most part issues of form. There is an obstinate problem of indistinctness running through the work. The recurrent summaries, both internal and thematic, the forecasts, the exhaustively particularized table of contents, are all tacit concessions to the existence of this problem. Seldom do positions come ringing through with conviction; often, notwithstanding the above-mentioned signposts, their origin, their precise connection to the text, is obscure. This is particularly true of the truncated final passages, where interpretation converts to criticism. In short, a fuller statement of significance might well have been supplied. A second problem, or at the least an annoying inconvenience, is the decision not to translate most of the abundant quotations from Hegel’s works into English. Some of the quotations are, for no apparent reason, in fact translated; and with well over 900 footnotes in a 200-page text anyway, translations would hardly constitute a stylistic blemish.—R. J. G. (shrink)

One might legitimately wonder why, if Christopher Middleton, in his Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, published translations of approximately ten per cent of the total available Nietzschean correspondence, the current translators have elected to repeat roughly sixty per cent of these in the present work. One might extend this misgiving to a further questioning as to why the co-translators have chosen to include "representative" passages of these letters when Middleton translates them in their entirety. Stripping sentences from paragraphs and paragraphs (...) from pages is surely no way to present a meaningful portrait of their author. If this were done with the intention of presenting a simple, non-contradictory view of Nietzsche's development or personality, it would be understandable, if unjustifiable. But it is not. If the present translations were markedly fresh and lucid in contrast to previously bungled efforts, it would be understandable. But they are not. If Middleton's content footnotes were occasionally lifted from Schlechta, they made up in substance what they lacked in originality. The few footnotes scattered here might be copiously expanded to explain what is going on--going on in the letter, going on in Nietzsche's development, going on in the book. As it is, all one can do is ask: Why bother?--R. J. G. (shrink)

This book, one of a large series, is a compilation of quotes. On the surface, this would seem an especially precarious task to undertake with Nietzsche; for he, perhaps more than any other philosopher, runs the danger of being drastically misunderstood when his remarks are wrenched from a broad context-having said practically everything at one point or another. Nietzsche has suffered so much from this that it is perhaps in principle unjustifiable to assent to any further effort along these lines. (...) Yet, this book does have the redeeming feature of organizing itself into a consistent pattern which does some justice to the notion that Nietzsche was, in fact, engaged in a systematic undertaking--albeit in his highly idiosyncratic way. It opens with a presentation of the symptoms of nihilism and its origin in metaphysics. The succeeding chapter deals with the overcoming of metaphysics. Out of this arises "The World as Will-to-Power." The epistemological consequences of this ontology are contained in "Truth and Valor". The collection concludes with a consideration of the over-man. A very precise index makes this a valuable reference book for those willing to trace their Nietzsche through the mediation of the French language.--R. J. G. (shrink)

This study investigated the performance of boys with psychopathic tendencies and comparison boys, aged 9 to 17 years, on two tasks believed to be sensitive to amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex func- tioning. Fifty-one boys were divided into two groups according to the Psychopathy Screening Device (PSD, P. J. Frick & R. D. Hare, in press) and presented with two tasks. The tasks were the gambling task (A. Bechara, A. R. Damasio, H. Damasio, & S. W. Anderson, 1994) and the Intradimensional/ (...) Extradimensional (ID/ED) shift task (R. Dias, T. W. Robbins, & A. C. Roberts, 1996). The boys with psychopathic tendencies showed impaired performance on the gambling task. However, there were no group differences on the ID/ED task either for response reversal or extradimensional set shifting. The implications of these results for models of psychopathy are discussed. (shrink)

This study investigates the ability of individuals with psychopathy to perform passive avoidance learning and whether this ability is modulated by level of reinforcement/punishment. Nineteen psychopathic and 21 comparison individuals, as defined by the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (Hare, 1991), were given a passive avoidance task with a graded reinforcement schedule. Response to each rewarding number gained a point reward specific to that number (i.e., 1, 700, 1400 or 2000 points). Response to each punishing number lost a point punishment specific (...) to that number (i.e., the loss of 1, 700, 1400 or 2000 points). In line with predictions, individuals with psychopathy made more passive avoidance errors than the comparison individuals. In addition, while the performance of both groups was modulated by level of reward, only the performance of the comparison population was modulated by level of punishment. The results are interpreted with reference to a computational account of the emotional learning impairment in individuals with psychopathy. (shrink)

This paper proposes a theory of institutional pluralism to deal with the question whether and to what extent limits should be placed on the market. It reconceives the pluralist position as it was presented by Michael Walzer and others in several respects. First, it argues that the options on the institutional menu should not be principles of distribution but rather economic mechanisms or ‘modes of provision’. This marks a shift from a distributive to a provisional logic. Second, it argues that (...) we should drop the assumption that any good should only be placed in one sphere, i.e. distributed according to one distributive principle. This marks a shift to ‘complex pluralism’: for at least some goods it is appropriate that they are provided through the market and through one or more non-market alternatives simultaneously. Finally, it argues that the often used conventionalist justification should be traded for a capability approach to the moral evaluation of markets and non-market alternatives. Any institutional option on our menu has value to the extent that it enhances the morally relevant capabilities of the producers and/or consumers of the good that is to be provided. This approach will be illustrated with two examples of goods for which it yields complex pluralist conclusions: the provision of care and the provision of media content. (shrink)

In the history of political thought, the relationship between property and power has been a central preoccupation. The very nature of private property, on many accounts, is to put owners in a position of self-serving power to make decisions about matters of concern to others. In many legal systems, the vast power of owners is pervasive, as an ever greater range of resources is brought within the property regime and subjected to private power backed by the coercive power of the (...) state. Political and legal philosophers have long puzzled over how to reconcile the nature of private property with the limits and social responsibilities upon which, at least for some accounts, property’s legitimacy depends. The perennial question, then, is how best to understand the nature of property such that property’s limits can also be accounted for coherently within our legal and constitutional arrangements. Robé’s book Property, Power and Politics provides us with a wide-ranging analysis of property. There is much that we agree with and applaud here. In this contribution we seek to situate a key aspect of his work within this larger context, and to offer a criticism of one element of his view: his rejection of an understanding of ownership as an office. In Robé’s analysis, offices belong in the public sphere, where officeholders are held to account by their constituencies. We argue that Robé’s rejection of the idea of ownership-as-office rests on a misunderstanding of the legal concept of “office.” Moreover, this idea, properly understood, provides sound conceptual support for the normative aims of Robé’s account: to bind property and social responsibility tightly together. Robé’s project to criticize the virtually unlimited power of private owners in the contemporary world is served, not undermined, by understanding property as an office. First, we provide a brief summary of the key elements of Robé’s view of property (Part II). We then introduce a theoretical perspective on property as office as it has been developed in legal theory (Part III). Finally, we argue that this perspective fits better with Robé’s stated purposes than his own rejection of it suggests and raises some questions for future discussion (Part IV). (shrink)

The rôle of mathematical models in growth studies is discussed and a distinction made between the structural and descriptive aspects of a mathematical formulation. A simple scheme is set up to represent in broad outline the simultaneous growth and interaction of larval and adult systems inMyrmica rubra and is matched against observed results.

Our present crises are growing more urgent, pervading many domains of public life—economic, political, environmental, and social. This motivates scholars to find more adequate, combinatory perspectives from which to explain them. One such effort, under the broad heading of Law and Political Economy (LPE), challenges an established view of legality that insulates the market and its dominant actors from critique and accountability. The established view is based on two misconceptions. First, it sees the real function of a capitalist legal device, (...) whether in contracts, antitrust, property, or corporate law, in terms of efficient wealth creation; this function is its underlying rationale and normative aim. Second, it tends to remove equality, coercion, and legitimacy—the core problems of power—from the scope of economic appraisal. When laws and policies are fashioned out of these ideas, democratic institutions will be unable to counter the dominance of capital. New analytical approaches are therefore necessary (Purdy et al. 2020). Along with researchers in associated fields, LPE scholars are attempting to better understand the legal constructions in which financial and political power are anchored and to develop new ways of integrating the economy into democratic life. Robé is a leading voice in these debates. His new book, Property, Power, and Politics, encloses in one volume his ideas on the role of incorporated firms—and of markets, property, and finance—in the larger dynamics of global politics. In this symposium, interlocutors with backgrounds in law, political science, and philosophy engage with this rich analysis. This introduction provides an overview of the book’s arguments (sections 2 and 3) and then introduces the contributions (section 4). (shrink)

The geometric system of deduction called N-Graphs was introduced by de Oliveira in 2001. The proofs in this system are represented by means of digraphs and, while its derivations are mostly based on Gentzen's sequent calculus, the system gets its inspiration from geometrically based systems, such as the Kneales' tables of development, Statman's proofs-as-graphs, Buss' logical flow graphs, and Girard's proof-nets. Given that all these geometric systems appeal to the classical symmetry between premises and conclusions, providing an intuitionistic version of (...) any of these is an interesting exercise in extending the range of applicability of the geometric system in question. In this article we produce an intuitionistic version of N-Graphs, based on Maehara's LJ' system, as described by Takeuti. Recall that LJ' has multiple conclusions in all but the essential intuitionistic rules, e.g., implication right and negation right. We show soundness and completeness of our intuitionistic N-Graphs with respect to LJ'. We also discuss how we expect to extend this work to a version of N-Graphs corresponding to the intuitionistic logic system FIL (Full Intuitionistic Logic) of de Paiva and Pereira and sketch future developments. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Understanding terrestrial carbon metabolism is critical because terrestrial ecosystems play a major role in the global carbon cycle. Furthermore, humans have severely disrupted the carbon cycle in ways that will alter the climate system and directly affect terrestrial metabolism. Changes in terrestrial metabolism may well be as important an indicator of global change as the changing temperature signal. Improving our understanding of the carbon cycle at various spatial and temporal scales will require the integration of multiple, complementary and independent methods (...) that are used by different research communities. Tools such as air sampling networks, inverse numerical methods, and satellite data allow us to study the strength and location of the global- and continental-scale carbon sources and sinks. Bottom-up studies provide estimates of carbon fluxes at finer spatial scales and examine the mechanisms that control fluxes at the ecosystem, landscape, and regional scales. Bottom-up approaches include comparative and process studies that provide the necessary mechanistic information to develop and validate terrestrial biospheric models. An iteration and reiteration of top-down and bottom-up approaches will be necessary to help constrain measurements at various scales. We propose a major international effort to coordinate and lead research programs of global scope of the carbon cycle. (shrink)

Systemic autoimmune diseases are characterized by the production of antibodies against a broad range of self-antigens. Recent evidence indicates that the majority of these autoantigens are modified in various ways during cell death. This has led to the hypothesis that the primary immune response in the development of autoimmunity is directed to components of the dying cell. In this article, we summarize data on the modification of autoantigens during cell death and the possible consequences of this for autoimmunity. BioEssays 22:627–636, (...) 2000. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Countermeasures for mpox (formerly known as monkeypox), primarily vaccines, have been in limited supply in many countries during outbreaks. Equitable allocation of scarce resources during public health emergencies is a complex challenge. Identifying the objectives and core values for the allocation of mpox countermeasures, using those values to provide guidance for priority groups and prioritisation tiers, and optimising allocation implementation are important. The fundamental values for the allocation of mpox countermeasures are: preventing death and illness; reducing the association between death (...) or illness and unjust disparities; prioritising those who prevent harm or mitigate disparities; recognising contributions to combating an outbreak; and treating similar individuals similarly. Ethically and equitably marshalling available countermeasures requires articulating these fundamental objectives, identifying priority tiers, and recognising trade-offs between prioritising the people at the highest risk of infection and the people at the highest risk of harm if infected. These five values can provide guidance on preferable priority categories for a more ethically sound response and suggest methods for optimising allocation of countermeasures for mpox and other diseases for which countermeasures are in short supply. Properly marshalling available countermeasures will be crucial for future effective and equitable national responses to outbreaks. (shrink)